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Abstract. This article focuses on the political claims made by immigrants and ethnic minori-
ties in France and Switzerland. We look at cross-national variations in the overall presence
of immigrants and ethnic minorities in the national public space, and the forms and content
of their claims. Following a political opportunity approach, we argue that claim-making is
affected both by institutional opportunities and by national models of citizenship. The civic-
assimilationist conception of citizenship in France gives migrants greater legitimacy to inter-
vene in the national public space. Furthermore, the inclusive definition of ‘membership in
the national community’ favors claims pertaining to minority integration politics. However,
the pressure toward assimilation to the republican norms and values tends to provoke claims
for the recognition of ethnic and cultural difference. Finally, closed institutional opportuni-
ties push migrants’ mobilization to become more radical, but at the same time the more
inclusive model of citizenship favors a moderate action repertoire of migrants. Conversely,
the ethnic-assimilationist view in Switzerland leads migrants to stress homeland-related
claims. When they do address the policy field of ethnic relations, immigration and citizen-
ship, they focus on issues pertaining to the entry and stay in the host society. Finally, the
forms of action are more moderate due to the more open institutional context, but at the
same time the action repertoire of migrants is moderated by the more exclusive model of
citizenship. Our article is an attempt to specify the concept of ‘political opportunity struc-
ture’, and to combine institutional and cultural factors in explaining claim-making by immi-
grants and ethnic minorities. We confront our arguments with data from a comparative
project on the mobilization on ethnic relations, citizenship and immigration.
A great deal of work on contentious politics during the past three decades has
followed the political process approach in trying to account for the emergence,
dynamics and outcomes of social movements, both comparatively across coun-
tries and over time (e.g., McAdam 1999; McAdam et al. 2001; Tarrow 1998;
Tilly 1978). The central concept in this perspective is that of political oppor-
tunity structures (Brockett 1991; Della Porta 1995; Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al.
1995; McAdam 1996; Tarrow 1998), which refers to political-institutional
aspects of the movements’ context such as the relative openness or closure of
the institutionalized political system, the stability or instability of that broad
set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity, the presence or absence
of elite allies, and the state’s capacity and propensity for repression (McAdam
1996).
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While explanations over at least the past two decades have stressed the
impact of such structural factors as political institutions and the individuals’
embeddedness in social networks, the recent emphasis on culture as expressed
in phenomena such as collective identities, public discourse and symbolic 
narratives (Gamson 1992; Johnston & Klandermans 1995; Morris & McClurg
Mueller 1992; Melucci 1996; Polletta 1998a, 1998b; Somers 1992, 1994; Tilly
1998, 1999), has brought the attention back to cultural variables in social move-
ment theory. Only rarely, however, have these works integrated culture into a
theory that acknowledges the decisive impact of political opportunities on the
nature and forms of protest activities.
We think that the study of contentious politics would benefit greatly from
an approach that pays more attention to the role of collective frames and
public discourse, while at the same time capitalizing on the advances made by
research with respect to political opportunity structures. Several recent works
on social movements and contentious politics have indicated a way of bring-
ing culture, framing and discourse into the political opportunity structure
model, hence integrating institutional and cultural explanations of protest.
These works usually distinguish between the political/institutional and the cul-
tural/discursive side of opportunities (e.g., Diani 1996; Gamson & Meyer 1996;
Goldstone 1998).
Attempts to integrate institutional and cultural aspects of the political
opportunity structure in order to provide a more satisfactory account of polit-
ical claim-making are also being made in the specific field of immigration
studies. Koopmans and Statham (1999a), for example, have looked at the rela-
tion between discursive and institutional opportunities to explain the differ-
ential success of the extreme right in Germany and Italy. They made an
analogous attempt in relation to the mobilization by migrants and, more gen-
erally, to political claim-making in the field of ethnic relations, citizenship 
and immigration (Koopmans & Statham 1999b, 1999c). Our approach builds
upon this perspective, which is more helpful for our specific purpose of
explaining cross-national variations in claim-making by immigrants and ethnic
minorities.
More precisely, in line with recent calls for a specification of the dimen-
sions of political opportunity (e.g., McAdam 1996), we try to go a step further
by specifying certain dimensions of opportunities that are of special relevance
for the policy field of ethnic relations, citizenship and immigration. We do so
by looking at a tradition that has stressed variations in the modes or regimes
of incorporation of migrants in the host society. We capture this aspect of
opportunities through the concept of ‘models of citizenship’. We argue that
contentious politics is enabled or constrained not only by (political) institu-
tions, but also by the shared (cultural) understandings and collective defini-
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tions of the groups involved and of the ways in which the members of those
groups should be included in or excluded from the larger community – in this
case, the national state.
We confront our argument with data from the 1990s on political claim-
making by immigrants and ethnic minorities in France and Switzerland, two
countries that differ substantially in the political opportunity structures for the
mobilization of social movements in general and of migrants in particular. The-
oretically, our approach is also inspired by Patrick Ireland’s (1994: 10) institu-
tional channeling theory, insofar as he stresses the impact of the institutional
context on immigrant mobilization and, at the same time, looks at dimensions
of political opportunities specific to the field of immigration and ethnic rela-
tions. In his perspective, ‘[t]he political opportunity structure includes the
immigrants’ legal situation; their social and political rights; and host-society
citizenship laws, naturalization procedures, and policies (and nonpolicies) in
such areas as education, housing, the labor market, and social assistance that
shape conditions and immigrants’ responses’. In addition, he looks at the role
of indigenous organizations as institutional gatekeepers that control the access
of immigrants to political participation.
Our approach, however, differs from Ireland’s in at least three respects.
First, his primary explanandum is the forms taken by immigrant political par-
ticipation. Although we also look at forms of action, our main focus is on the
nature of claims and their specific content. Second, he conceives of allies and
opponents (i.e., ‘gatekeepers’) as being part of the political opportunity struc-
ture. We examine how gatekeepers act in ways that depend on opportunity
structures, specifically on models of citizenship. Third, and perhaps more fun-
damentally, he takes concrete policies and laws as part of the opportunity
structure. We think that they are also influenced by the latter, specifically by
the national models of citizenship. This does not mean that we challenge
Ireland’s theory or approach. Our analysis is located at a different level and
focuses on different aspects. It is more neo-institutionalist to the extent that,
in addition to concrete political institutions such as legal systems or channels
for participation, we look at the shared understanding of the criteria of inclu-
sion and exclusion of outsiders as the cultural substratum in which concrete
institutions are embedded and by which they are influenced.
The structure of migrant populations in France and Switzerland
France and Switzerland are traditional receiving countries. Both recruited
large numbers of immigrants as foreign labor in the period after the Second
World War in order to fill the needs of an expanding economy. In the 
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mid-1970s, when the economic crisis produced recession and higher unem-
ployment rates, the inflow of migrants did not stop completely, in spite of all
the efforts on the part of governments to close borders (Hollifield 1992).
Family reunification and, to a lesser extent, increasing flows of asylum seekers
and illegal aliens became the principal sources of immigration after the oil
crisis.
The structure of the population of migrant origin, however, is quite differ-
ent in the two countries, not least because of France’s colonial past. First 
of all, in 1990 the share of the foreign population equaled 6.4 per cent in 
France and 16.3 per cent in Switzerland (Soysal 1994; Swiss figures exclude
seasonal and frontier workers). This difference, of course, stems in part from
Switzerland’s restrictive rules for obtaining citizenship rights. The difference
in the share of immigrants, including citizens of migrant origin, is in fact much
less pronounced. Yet for our present purpose it is more useful to look at the
national composition of migrants. Immigrants in France come above all from
two geographic areas: Southern Europe (Italy, Spain and Portugal)1 and the
Maghreb countries (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia). The strong presence of
immigrants from the Maghreb is reflected in a large part of the population
being of Islamic religion. Its relationship with the national majority and the
state is probably the major challenge faced by France today in terms of ethnic
relations and the politics of difference.
In Switzerland, like in France, there is a strong presence of Italians,
Spaniards and Portuguese. The proportion of these three communities,
however, varies considerably. Italy is by far the largest among all foreign
nationalities. Indeed, Italians have long defined the entire immigration issue
in Switzerland (Pittau & Ulivi 1986). Generally speaking, the main difference
with France lies in the lack of a substantial Maghrebian community, although
in certain local situations in the French-speaking part of the country (espe-
cially Geneva) its presence is not negligible. Another characteristic of the
structure of the foreign population in Switzerland is the high proportion of
immigrants from former Yugoslavia, although the share of people coming from
the Balkans has been subject to strong shifts over time due to the arrival (and
departure) of war refugees (Albanians and Bosnians, in particular) escaping
the dramatic situation that has occurred in that region during the last decade.2
Finally, we should note that the proportion of Turks is quite similar in the two
countries (about 5 per cent of the total foreign population).
Political opportunities and the mobilization of social movements
Political opportunity theories stress the impact of institutional factors on
political contention and claim-making. This has been done basically following
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two directions: first, cross-sectionally to account for variations in the levels and
forms of protest in different (national) settings (e.g., Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et
al. 1995; Rucht 1994); second and most frequently, longitudinally to explain
the rise and fall of a movement or set of movements in a given context as well
as the changing patterns of mobilization over time (e.g., Costain 1992; Kriesi
et al. 1995; McAdam 1999; Meyer 1990; Tarrow 1989). In both cases, the 
standard explanandum is the amount of protest and/or the forms it takes. The
underlying assumption in this perspective, as in the political process approach
more generally, is that people who act to form a social movement make strate-
gic choices that are strongly influenced by certain features of their political-
institutional context.
For Kriesi et al. (1992, 1995), political opportunity structures are made up
of four dimensions: the salience of existing cleavages in society, the configu-
ration of power, certain features of the formal political institutions and the
prevailing strategies of authorities to deal with challengers. The latter two
aspects are relevant to the explanation of action repertoires. By combining
them, we obtain the typology of the general structural setting for the mobi-
lization of social movements shown in Figure 1 (although we focus on France
and Switzerland in this article, we include other countries in the typology for
illustrative purposes). The combination of open political institutions and inclu-
sive prevailing strategies results in a setting labeled ‘integration’ by Kriesi et
al. (1995), in which movements have facilitated access to the political system
and, at the same time, are rarely repressed. Switzerland is perhaps the best
empirical approximation of this case. France typifies the opposite situation,
called ‘selective inclusion’, in which a closed system is generally accompanied
by exclusive prevailing strategies.
According to this view, when social movements are faced with repression
coupled with a lack of access to the political system, they tend to radicalize
migrant mobilization
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Figure 1. The institutional setting for mobilization by challengers.
Source: Adapted from Kriesi et al. (1995: 37).
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their actions since closed opportunity structures yield little facilitation, poor
chances of success and a high degree of threat in case of inaction (Kriesi et al.
1995; Tilly 1978). France typifies this situation. By contrast, movements tend
to make use of moderate forms of action when they find open political oppor-
tunity structures – that is, when they encounter little repression and many
points of access to the system. This combination offers higher facilitation,
increases the chances of success and diminishes the degree of threat. This is
the case in Switzerland. Kriesi et al. (1995) have shown this explanation to
hold for social movements in general and for the new social movements 
in particular. The question is to what extent this also applies to migrant 
mobilization.
Most of the time political opportunity theorists have focused on the emer-
gence of social movements or the extent and forms of their mobilization. As
McAdam et al. (1996: 7) have pointed out: ‘virtually all “theories” in the field
are, first and foremost, theories of movement emergence’. Much less explored
is how political opportunities may influence the content of mobilization. We
would like to inquire more thoroughly into the determinants of the specific
content and thematic focus of claims by immigrants and ethnic minorities. We
do so by looking at cultural aspects of opportunities that follow from the
national models of citizenship. To look not only at the forms, but also at the
content, of claims is important for a variety of reasons. First of all, this gives
us a chance to improve our knowledge of social movements by highlighting
the limitations of existing theories based on a political institutional framework.
Second, we still lack systematic empirical knowledge about the specific claims
made by immigrants and ethnic minorities. Do they ask for better integration
into the host society? Do they express their need for recognition as collectiv-
ities? Do they mobilize in reaction to, and with the aim of influencing, events
occurring in their homeland? To answer these and related questions is of great
importance in reaching an understanding of the political participation of
migrants in multicultural societies that rests on systematic observation rather
than on recurring examples of minority demands whose empirical represen-
tativeness is at least doubtful. Finally, knowing the content of claims is impor-
tant for the analysis of state policies and responsiveness in the field of
immigration and ethnic relations since effective state responses must adapt to
what is claimed.
Models of citizenship: a specification of the political opportunity
structure
Institutions can be defined as ‘basic rules of the game or principles of order
that characterize a particular society at a particular point in time’ (Clemens
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1998: 110). Such principles can be anchored in a society’s political life and 
crystallize in concrete power relations and forms of government. Political
opportunity structures represent this aspect of institutions in the terrain of
social movement theory. However, as recent trends in institutionalist theory
in history, sociology and political science have pointed out (e.g., Powell &
DiMaggio 1991; Scott 1995; Steinmo et al. 1992), institutions also have a cul-
tural side. Thus, ‘durable or regular patterns of social life reflect deeply embed-
ded, at times sacralized, cultural components’ (Clemens 1998: 117). In
addition, institutions draw their effectiveness not only from the internalization
of norms and practices or from the power of social sanctioning, but also from
the collective definitions and public discourses that make them part of a shared
identity. Models of citizenship capture much of the shared identity for the spe-
cific ‘institution’ represented by the national state. For this reason, they are of
crucial importance for the definition of the contested boundaries of the politi-
cal field of immigration and ethnic relations.
Recent comparative work on national regimes for the incorporation of
migrants have stressed the importance of citizenship rights (Brubaker 1992;
Castles 1995; Favell 1998a; Koopmans & Statham 1999b, 2000; Smith & Blanc
1996; Soysal 1994). Brubaker’s (1992) work points to the cultural foundations
of national states and how present-day formal definitions of citizenship reflect
deeply rooted understandings of nationhood. In his comparison of France and
Germany, he shows that the German jus sanguinis legal tradition is based on
a conception of the national community in ethnocultural terms, while the
French tradition, which emphasizes the jus solis rule, stems from a republican,
contractualistic and political definition of the state. He explains this difference
by referring to the divergent history of state formation in the two countries:
‘In France, then, a bureaucratic monarchy engendered a political and ter-
ritorial conception of nationhood; while in Germany, the disparity in scale
between supranational Empire and the subnational profusion of sovereign and
semisovereign political units fostered the development of an ethnocultural
understanding of nationhood’ (Brubaker 1992: 4). In brief, German citizen-
ship is ethnic-based and reflects the idea of the nation-state, while French 
citizenship is civic-based and reflects the idea of the nation-state. Both com-
ponents are constitutive of the national state as a form of political organiza-
tion, although in diverse mixtures. Of course, this is an old idea that goes back
to Meinecke’s (1919) distinction between Kulturnation and Staatsnation. What
is new, we think, is our effort to examine how these different ways to conceive
a nation affects the political claim-making in the field of immigration and
ethnic relations.
In spite of the importance of this aspect, models of citizenship are not only
defined by the prevailing conceptions of nationhood. The cultural obligations
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posed on immigrants to be accepted in the national community play a role as
well (Koopmans & Statham 1999b, 2000). Just as states have formal criteria
for access to citizenship that can vary from one country to another, they also
place different cultural obligations on defining the access to citizenship. Again,
we can distinguish between two ideal-types: those states that follow an as-
similationist (or monist) approach and those that adopt a pluralistic view. The
former are more demanding, for immigrants are asked to conform to the cul-
tural norms and values of the host society. The latter are less restrictive, for
they provide for the recognition of ethnic difference and sometimes even
actively promote it.
We can conceptualize the political opportunity structure for claim-making
by immigrants and ethnic minorities as resulting from different combinations
of the formal criteria of citizenship and the cultural obligations for having
access to it (Koopmans & Statham 1999b, 2000). Figure 2 shows the resulting
typology, which yields four models of citizenship – that is, four national regimes
of incorporation of migrants (examples outside France and Switzerland are
included for illustrative purposes). First, the combination of an ethnic defini-
tion of nationhood and citizenship with an assimilationist view of cultural
obligations gives us a situation in which it is very difficult for foreigners to
become members of the national community. This situation corresponds to the
ethnic-assimilationist model of citizenship3 – a regime of incorporation that
pushes towards assimilation to the norms and values of the national commu-
nity on an ethnocultural basis and tends to exclude those who are not entitled
to sharing its norms, values and symbols.
Minorities face both an exclusionary national community and a demand-
ing environment in terms of the extent to which they have to adapt to the rules
and cultural codes of the host country, hence downplaying their ethnic differ-
ence. Germany, despite recent liberalization of naturalization procedures, is
perhaps the best empirical approximation of this model. Among new coun-
tries of immigration, Italy is another example. Most importantly for our
purpose, Switzerland also follows this model. While Switzerland is pluralist
toward the cultures traditionally recognized within the context of federalism
and the existing informal procedures for the integration of national minori-
ties, it is much less pluralist toward ethnic minorities of migrant origin, espe-
cially those who arrived most recently. Immigrants are asked to adapt to the
new cultural context. Of course, they cannot do so with respect to a national
cultural model, as it simply does not exist, but the acquisition of Swiss citi-
zenship is locally based and prospective citizens must assimilate to the local
habits and values – that is, to the local culture.
A second group in Figure 2 is found where a civic conception of citizen-
ship combines with a pluralistic view of cultural obligations. This is the 
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civic-pluralist model of citizenship, which is exemplified by Britain and the
Netherlands. Foreigners born in the host country are in principle granted cit-
izenship regardless of their ethnic origin and minorities are recognized their
right to ethnic difference.
The third type combines a civic conception of citizenship and an assimila-
tionist view of cultural obligations. This is the case of France, which is the
archetypal example of the civic-assimilationist model of citizenship. It is rela-
tively easy to obtain French citizenship, but the price to be paid for that is
giving up ethnic-based identities in favor of accepting the republican ideal of
the state.
Finally, the fourth type couples an ethnic conception of citizenship with a
pluralistic view of cultural obligations (what we refer here to as ‘civic plural-
ism’ is often referred to in the literature as well as in political debates as 
‘multiculturalism’). This model, which we call the ethnic-pluralist model of cit-
izenship, is probably less common than the other three. On the level of actual
practice, it has sometimes been so stretched as to translate into segregationist
policies, like in South Africa under Apartheid. The millet system of the
Ottoman Empire is another example,4 but organized along religious rather
than ethnic lines insofar as a subject population is ruled through the hierar-
chy of religious leaders and the grouping of individuals according to their 
religion.
An empirical assessment of the models of citizenship in France and
Switzerland
One of the main weaknesses of the political opportunity approach to 
social movements lies perhaps in the lack of an empirical measure of the 
migrant mobilization
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Figure 2. The cultural setting for mobilization by immigrants and ethnic minorities.
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independent variable (i.e., political opportunity structures). This considerably
weakens the strength of the approach and of explanations based on such vari-
ables, as one has to rely on secondary literature or on a quite impressionistic
picture of the opportunity structure in a given country. In order to avoid this
pitfall, we have gathered systematic information on a series of indicators 
for each of the two dimensions of the models of citizenship in France and
Switzerland. We deal in more detail with this aspect elsewhere (Giugni &
Passy 2003). Here it is enough to summarize the main results. Tables 1 and 2
present the complete sets of indicators, respectively, for the formal and the cul-
tural dimension. We assigned a score between 0 and 1 to each indicator,
depending on the degree to which the indicator pointed to an ethnic or civic
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Table 1. Scores for France and Switzerland on the formal dimension of citizenship
Indicators France Switzerland
Acquisition of nationality
(1) First generation
Number of years required 1 0
Costs 1 0
Financial independence required 1 0
(2) Second generation
Jus solis 1 0
Special measures for easier access 1 0.50
(3) Special rights for national minorities 0 0
(4) Double nationality 1 1
(5) Naturalization rate 1 0
Social and residence rights
(6) Residence statuses 1 0
(7) Family reunification 1 1
(8) Expulsions 1 0
(9) Access to labor market 0.50 0
(10) Access to welfare state 1 1
(11) Access to property, credits, etc. 1 0
Political rights
(11) Voting rights 0 0.25
Anti-discrimination measures
(12) State agencies to fight discriminations 0.50 0.50
(race, ethnicity, religion)
Total 13 4.25
Note: Scores are assigned on a five-point scale (0, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 1). Values close to 0 
indicate an ethnic conception of citizenship. Scores close to 1 indicate a civic conception of
citizenship.
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conception of citizenship (formal dimension) or a pluralist or assimilationist
view of cultural obligations (cultural dimension).
Our indicators for the cultural dimension focus on the question of the
recognition of Islam. We opted for this specific factor mainly for two reasons.
First, it was very problematic to have a more general assessment for all types
of ethnic or religious groups and, second, Islam is currently at the center of
public discourses and policy measures with respect to the politics of ethnic dif-
ference. Scores have been assigned on a five-point scale (0, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 1).
On the formal dimension, the value 0 was assigned to those indicators with
the maximum degree of ethnic-based conception of citizenship, the value 1 to
migrant mobilization
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Table 2. Scores for France and Switzerland on the cultural dimension of citizenship
Indicators France Switzerland
School system
(1) Islamic schools 0 0
(2) Islamic education in public schools 0 0.50
(3) Authorization to wear the Islamic veil
Pupils 1 1
Teachers 0 0
Military system
(4) Authorization not to wear the uniform 0 0
Public media system
(5) Islamic programs on public channels 0 0
(6) Foreign language programs on public channels 0 0
Religious practices
(7) Call to prayer (el muezim) 0 0
(8) State-financed training of imams 0 0
(9) Circumcision 1 0.50
(10) Ritual slaughter of animals 0.50 0
(11) Islamic cemeteries 0.50 0.50
Political practices
(12) Representative bodies for foreigners 0.25 0.50
Labor market practices
(13) Positive discrimination policy in the private sector 0 0
(14) Positive discrimination policy in the public sector 0 0
Citizenship practices
(15) Conditions for naturalization 0 0
Total 3.25 3
Note: Scores are assigned on a five-point scale (0, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 1). Values close to 0 indi-
cate a pluralist view of the cultural obligations of migrants. Values close to 1 indicate an
assimilationist view of the cultural obligations of migrants.
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those indicators with the maximum degree of civic-based conception of citi-
zenship and the intermediate values accordingly in between. Similarly, on the
cultural dimension, the value 0 was assigned to those indicators with the
maximum degree of pluralist view of the cultural obligations, the value 1 to
those indicators with the maximum degree of an assimilationist view of the
cultural obligations, and the intermediate values accordingly in between. In
order to make the reading of the typology easier, Figure 1 shows which side
of the two continua the 0 and 1 values fall.
Based on the two sets of indicators, we can place our two countries within
the typology shown in Figure 1, this time on empirical grounds. France and
Switzerland are clearly in different, if not completely opposite, groupings in
terms of the formal criteria of citizenship. As we have hypothesized, and as
the literature in general correctly indicates, France follows a civic conception
of citizenship, while Switzerland has a prevailing ethnic definition. At the same
time, however, this empirical assessment allows us to nuance an excessively
idealistic view of the models of citizenship in the two countries. On the one
hand, while France certainly lies within a civic conception of citizenship, since
it scored 13 points out of a maximum possible total of 16 (i.e., a maximum
score of 1 point on all the indicators), it is in some respects closer to the ethnic
pole of the continuum – for example, in terms of political rights, access to the
public sector labor market and effective state agencies to fight racial, ethnic
and religious discriminations. Similarly, Switzerland is closer in some respects
to the civic pole of the continuum as it scored 4.25 points over a maximum
possible total of 16. On the other hand, significant changes have occurred in
recent years – for example, the introduction of dual nationality, the diminu-
tion of the costs of naturalization procedures and the introduction of an anti-
discrimination law.
While France and Switzerland differ in the formal criteria of citizenship,
they share similar ways of dealing with ethnic difference. Both France and
Switzerland follow an assimilationist view of the cultural obligations of
migrants. Therefore, the tentative positioning of the two countries within the
typology shown in Figure 1 is correct also with respect to this dimension. Over
a maximum total possible of 16 points, France scores 3.25 points and Switzer-
land 3 points, which places them clearly towards the assimilationist pole of the
continuum. Again, the assimilationist view is incomplete, for both France and
Switzerland display some flexibility in the recognition of ethnic and cultural
difference, such as allowing the Islamic veil to be worn in schools, Islamic
cemeteries and male circumcision. Yet the general policy is one of denial of
the difference of ethnic groups in favor of allegiance to the norms and values
of the host society.
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The empirical assessment of the models of citizenship in France and
Switzerland also allow us indirectly to respond to the recent criticisms
addressed to national models of citizenship (e.g., Brubaker 1999; Favell 1998b;
Weil 2002). Brubaker (1999) has called into question the distinction between
civic and ethnic conceptions of the nation. More specifically, he has acknowl-
edged that this distinction is problematic from both a normative and an ana-
lytical point of view, and proposes to replace it with the distinction between
state-framed and counter-state nationalism. However, the brief analysis sum-
marized here shows that this approach remains useful to distinguish between
national traditions in the way states deal with ethnic difference and that such
models can indeed be observed empirically.5
Data retrieval and methods of analysis
We confront our theoretical arguments with data from an ongoing compara-
tive research project on the mobilization of ethnic relations, citizenship and
immigration.6 The data were retrieved by content analysis of one national
newspaper in each country (Le Monde in France and the Neue Zürcher
Zeitung in Switzerland). Claims were sampled by coding every second 
issue of the newspaper source for the period from 1990 to 1998. We define a
‘political claim’ as any strategic intervention, verbal or non-verbal, made on
behalf of a collectivity and visible in the public space that bears on the inter-
ests or rights of other collectivities. These include: protest actions and collec-
tive mobilizations (street demonstrations, petitions, confrontational and
violent actions, etc.), speech acts (public statements, written reports, media-
addressed events in general, etc.) and political decisions (laws, administrative
acts, judicial decisions, etc.).
We coded claims pertaining to immigration and asylum policy, minority
integration politics (including citizenship) and antiracism. These claims define
the political field of ethnic relations, citizenship and immigration. In addition,
we coded all claims by migrants, regardless of their relation to this field. Home-
land politics is included in this subsample. Finally, we coded all claims by
extreme-right actors. In this article, we consider only claims by immigrants and
ethnic minorities. Most of the analyses below consider both verbal (i.e., speech
acts) and non-verbal (i.e., protest actions and collective mobilizations) claims.
However, we excluded non-verbal claims from the analysis of the thematic
focus of migrant claims.
For each claim retrieved, we coded a number of relevant variables. The
most important are: the location in time and place of the claim, the actor who
migrant mobilization
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makes the claim, the form of the claim, the content of the claim, the target of
the claim and the object of the claim. The coding was done following a semi-
open system of code lists which allowed us to obtain as much detail as pos-
sible on the variables of interest and, at the same time, provided a structured
scheme of data collection. In particular, the code list for the aim of the claims
has been left open and coders asked to add new codes each time they encoun-
tered a new type of claim. The information contained in the raw variables 
has been summarized in a set of variables to be used in cross-national com-
parisons. The analyses presented in this article are based on these summary
variables.
In line with our theoretical aim to combine institutional and cultural vari-
ables in the study of contentious politics in general, and of the claim-making
by immigrants and ethnic minorities in particular, the method we adopt is an
elaboration of protest event analysis – an approach that have become popular
in recent years among political opportunity theorists, who used it to gather
systematic evidence on the levels and forms of social movement mobilization.
The method adopted here – ‘political claims analysis’ – expands traditional
protest event analysis in at least three ways (Koopmans & Statham 1999c).
First, it looks not only at protest events as unconventional actions by non-insti-
tutional actors, but also takes into account all types of claims and interven-
tions in the public space. Second, and related to that, it considers all kinds of
collective actors – both institutional and non-institutional – in addition to
social movement organizations and groups. Third, it places the content of
claims at center stage by giving much more detail in the description of the the-
matic focus of events.
Previous work on social movements and contentious politics has proved
the robustness of protest event analysis as a way to measure movement mobi-
lization (e.g., Kriesi et al. 1995; Olzak 1989; Tarrow 1989; Tilly et al. 1975; see
further Rucht et al. 1998). However, legitimate doubts may be raised as to pos-
sible biases stemming from the use of newspapers as a source for the retrieval
of events. First of all, criticisms may be addressed to our choice to rely only
on a single newspaper in each country. This choice stems in part from practi-
cal reasons as it is simply too time-consuming to collect event, or even worse,
claim data over a long period for more than one country and for a wide range
of actors. Existing assessments of this methodology, however, have shown that
the choice of single newspaper provides robust results. For example, Koop-
mans (1998) has compared the data of Kriesi et al. (1995), who relied on a
single source in each of the four countries studied, with those collected in the
Prodat project on Germany (see Hocke 1998; Rucht & Neidhardt 1998), who
used two different newspapers. In spite of a number of differences in the data
collection procedure used in the two cases, he found (quite encouragingly for
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us) that a comparison of the development of the number of protest events
yields highly similar results, with a correlation close to 0.94. In addition, he
also found very similar development of both the number of events and the
number of participants of the anti-nuclear movement. Second, again concern-
ing the sampling strategy, some have criticized the use of a non-random
sample, especially the choice to take only the Monday issue of the paper 
(Barranco & Wisler 1999). Since we took every second newspaper issue, biases
due to sampling should be much less relevant in our case. Our sample is more
comprehensive than the one based on the Monday issue and is not biased
toward events occurring during the weekend. Therefore, this problem is largely
avoided here.
Apart from sampling issues, the use of newspapers to measure protest
events or political claims may lead to selection and description biases
(McCarthy et al. 1996). First, selection biases could be important when one
looks only at social movement actions and protest events, as the publication
of events is influenced by their size, radicalness and novelty, as well as by the
issue attention cycle (Danzger 1975; McCarthy et al. 1996; Snyder & Kelly
1977). However, here we are interested not only in protest events, but in all
forms of action, including speech acts and political decisions. The selection bias
is likely to be less important for this kind of events. Furthermore, we take
newspapers as the vehicle for the debates occurring in the public space. There-
fore, the filter made by newspapers allows us to assess the degree of access of
social and political actors to the public space. Second, description biases
should not be too strong insofar as we are coding the actors’ stated goals and
not the journalists’ judgements or analyses of the event at hand. Comparisons
made with additional newspapers for the cases of Britain and Germany on
data equivalent to those we analyze here suggest that description biases are
limited (Koopmans & Statham 1999b).
In sum, in spite of limitations which do exist and which we must acknowl-
edge, newspapers are a good source for the coverage of news of national scope
and significance – that is, those we are particularly interested in. Finally, poten-
tial intercoder reliability problems were to a large extent avoided as we
checked every single event in our data set and corrected for possible coding
errors or variations from one coder to the other.
Legitimacy and access to the national public space
We derive a number of specific hypotheses about the forms and content of
claims by immigrants and ethnic minorities in France and Switzerland from
the institutional and cultural settings described above. First, and on the more
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general level, models of citizenship determine the degree of access to for
minorities to the national public space. The various conceptions of citizenship
determine the status of migrants in a given national space and hence the
degree of legitimacy for political participation. The collective definition of 
‘citizenship’ – and more generally of the patterns of inclusion in and exclusion
from the national community – influences the degree to which they feel as
though they belong to that community and hence legitimized to intervene in
the national public space. The prevailing use of such labels as ‘immigrés’
(‘immigrants’) in France and ‘Ausländer’ (‘foreigners’) in Switzerland are 
the discursive reflection of such varying sense of belonging and legitimacy
(Kastoryano 1996; similarly, the British and Dutch civic-pluralist model 
yields such prevailing labels as ‘ethnic’ or ‘racial’ minorities and ‘etnishe 
minderheden’).
Different ways of labeling migrants can also be seen in the existing legis-
lation: while in France one speaks of ‘immigration law’, the main legal frame-
work in Switzerland is the ‘Law on the Establishment and Sojourn of
Foreigners’. Similarly, the institutional bodies in charge of the migrant issues
have different names: for example, the French ‘State Secretary for Immigrants’
and ‘National Commission for the Housing of Immigrants’ contrast with the
Swiss ‘Federal Office of Foreigners’ and ‘Federal Commission of Foreigners’.
We hypothesize that migrants come to share this perception of their status in
the host society. For example, in a country where an ethnic-assimilationist
model of incorporation prevails, migrants should address claims primarily to
their homeland rather than to their host country, because they do not feel as
belonging fully to the national community in which they live. Concerning the
general thematic focus of claims, we therefore expect France’s civic-based
model to facilitate the presence of migrants in the national public debates and
encourage them to make claims about their situation in the host society. On
the other hand, the Swiss ethnic-based model should produce a stronger
emphasis on homeland issues – that is, issues pertaining to one’s country of
origin.
Table 3 shows the distribution of claims in France and Switzerland accord-
ing to the nationality of migrants. This gives us an idea of which ethnic groups
have intervened in the public space during the period under study. We can
make three remarks with regard to this aspect of claim-making. First, differ-
ent groups of migrants have mobilized in the two countries. While in France,
immigrants from North Africa (mostly Algerians, Moroccans and Tunisians)
and minorities from the Jewish community have mobilized the most among
those groups for which the nationality or the ethnicity was specified, in
Switzerland it was Turks and Kurds, as well as by people from former
Yugoslavia. Second, the distribution of claims by nationality or ethnicity does
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not necessarily reflect the structure of migrant populations in the two coun-
tries. This holds true particularly for Switzerland. For example, as we have seen
earlier, Italians are the largest ethnic group in Switzerland, but their mobi-
lization is very weak. On the other hand, Turks and Kurds are largely over-
represented in the public space, if we compare them to the size of their
communities in the country. This difference between the size of ethnic groups
and their mobilization clearly suggests that political opportunities vary across
ethnic groups. Thus, the weak level of mobilization by Italians might be due
to the fact that more institutional channels are open to them as they arrived
at an early period and are now to a large extent settled and better integrated
in the country than other nationalities such as Turks and Kurds. Furthermore,
as we will see below, the latter mobilize to a large extent with respect to their
homeland, partly because there is a salient conflict there, but also because they
migrant mobilization
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Table 3. Distribution of claims by immigrants and ethnic
minorities by nationality/ethnicity, 1990–1998 percentages
Nationality/ethnicity
France
Maghrebian, North African 22.3
Jewish 18.7
Other African 4.2
Turkish, Kurdish 3.0
Other nationality/ethnicity 2.5
Country of residence/nationality 7.2
No specification of nationality/ethnicity 42.0
Total 99.9*
N 471
Switzerland
Turkish, Kurdish 32.6
(Former) Yugoslavian 17.1
Jewish 7.2
Tibetan 4.9
Albanian 4.2
Tamil 4.2
Italian 2.7
Other nationality/ethnicity 6.4
Country of residence/nationality 10.2
No specification of nationality/ethnicity 11.0
Total 100.5*
N 264
Note: Includes both verbal and non-verbal claims.
*Do not add to 100 due to rounding percentage
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lack institutional and cultural opportunities in the host society. Third, the share
of claims by migrants without the specification of nationality or ethnicity is
much larger in France. This is in line with the prediction that can be derived
from the models of citizenship. For, while the Swiss model is rather exclusive
and defines migrants largely along ethnic lines, the French model is more inclu-
sive and the civic-based conception of citizenship it conveys discourages self-
presentation as a specific national or ethnic group.
Although we have seen which ethnic groups are more active in claim-
making, we still do not know anything about the extent of the presence of
migrants in the national public space. Table 4 shows that in Switzerland the
participation of migrants in the field of immigration and ethnic relations is
quite limited. Minority actors were involved only in 6 per cent of all the speech
acts and collective mobilizations related to this policy field between 1990 and
1998. They are more present in France, where just below 13 per cent of claims
were made by migrants. However, their overall presence in the public space
is found to be rather low in both countries. If we confront these results 
with comparable evidence from Britain, where about one-fifth of the claims
come from minorities (Koopmans & Statham 1999b: 684), we see that France
lies between Switzerland and Britain. This shows that there is indeed a rela-
tionship between models of citizenship and the opportunities available to
migrants to intervene in the national public space. Specifically, these findings
confirm the hypothesis that the civic-pluralist model provides the most oppor-
tunities, followed by the civic-assimilationist model, and then by the ethnic-
assimilationist model. The fact that Germany, with about 7 per cent of the
claims in this field made by minority actors, is close to Switzerland (Koopmans
& Statham 1999b: 684) further confirms our hypothesis as these two countries
share a similar model of citizenship.
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Table 4. Overall presence of immigrants and ethnic minorities in the public space in France
and Switzerland, 1990–1998
Immigration and ethnic
All claims relations field
France Switzerland France Switzerland
Minority actors involved 10.7 12.6 12.6 6.0
Other actors involved 89.3 87.4 87.4 94.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 4,385 2,092 3,320 1,695
Note: Includes both verbal and non-verbal claims.
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Although nearly one-fifth of its population is of foreign origin, Switzerland
neither legitimates them as political actors nor offers them viable opportuni-
ties for making claims pertaining to their situation in the host society. To be
sure, foreigners in Switzerland do mobilize, yet they do so largely to address
their grievances relating to their homeland. As we can see in the second
column of Table 4, if we also take into account issues outside the immigration
and ethnic relations field, the overall presence in the public space by minor-
ity actors increases and becomes even stronger than in France. However, the
distribution of claims according to their general orientation (shown in Table
5) indicates that about 60 per cent of their claims refer to homeland politics
and not to the host country’s political agenda. By contrast, less than 10 per
cent of claims in France deal with homeland politics. Since they are weakly
integrated into the host society, migrants in Switzerland tend to keep strong
ties with their country of origin. They have long been considered, and are in
part still considered, to be temporary guest-workers who will one day return
to their country and therefore do not need to be integrated, as the lack of a
coherent integration policy attests. The lack of integration and feeling of
belonging to the national community in the country of residence encourages
them to maintain the links with their homeland and to mobilize on issues
related to it, rather than issues pertaining to their situation in the host society.
Alternatively, although a large part of France’s migrant populations come
from countries with dramatic internal conflicts such as Algeria and to a 
lesser extent Turkey that would fully justify their involvement in their home-
land’s affairs, only a small part of their claims are addressed to their country
of origin. The way in which they are incorporated into the French national
community leads them to be more active politically in France and to partici-
pate to a larger extent than their Swiss counterparts in French political life.
Migrants in France are not considered guest-workers, unlike in Switzerland
and Germany for example, but rather as people living permanently or at least
migrant mobilization
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Table 5. Claims by immigrants and ethnic minorities in France
and Switzerland by general orientation, 1990–1998 percentage
France Switzerland
Politics of host country 91.1 39.4
Homeland politics 8.9 60.6
Total 100.0 100.0
N 471 264
Note: Includes both verbal and non-verbal claims.
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for a long period in the country and thus having more legitimacy to partici-
pate in public debates.
In sum, the presence of ethnic minorities in the public space is largely con-
strained by national models of citizenship that define to a large extent the
legitimacy of minority groups to participate in public debates and determine
the access for their intervention in the national public space. The collective
attribution of the status of migrants in the host society influences both the dis-
tribution of cultural resources and the space for their political participation.
Migrant participation in the field of ethnic relations, citizenship and
immigration
Turning to the forms and content of claims made by migrants within the field
of ethnic relations, citizenship and immigration in the host society, a first
hypothesis concerns action repertoires. Following Kriesi et al.’s (1995) account
of the strategic choices made by challengers, immigrants and ethnic minorities,
we may expect that they, like all other collective actors, make use of radical
forms of action in a closed general structural setting like that of France and
more moderate forms in an open setting like that of Switzerland. Based on
the models of citizenship approach, however, the expectations go in the 
opposite direction. The civic-based conception of citizenship in France offers
a more favorable setting for the mobilization of immigrants and ethnic minori-
ties than the ethnic-based conception in Switzerland. Thus, we would expect
the action repertoire of migrants to be determined both by the institutional
opportunity structures and by the specific opportunities deriving from the
national models of citizenship. Since institutional opportunities are closed 
and cultural opportunities rather open in France, and the opposite holds in
Switzerland, we should observe similar action repertoires of migrants in the
two countries.
The distribution of collective mobilization by form of action (shown in
Table 6) provides evidence confirming this hypothesis.7 The action repertoire
of migrants is somewhat more radical in France. In particular, they make more
use of confrontational actions. Yet the share of violent actions does not differ
substantially in the two countries. Lacking an easy institutional access, if they
want to be heard in a context characterized by closed opportunity structures,
migrants must act – as any other protest group – with some degree of 
radicalness.
Of course, since we have opposing expectations from two theoretical per-
spectives (institutional and cultural opportunities), the binary comparison
here is especially tricky. However, if we compare these findings with the dis-
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tribution of forms of protest events in general, we can see how the opportu-
nities deriving from the national models of citizenship have a moderating
effect in France and a radicalizing effect in Switzerland. For example, Kriesi
et al. (1992: Table 2) have shown that, during the period from 1975 to 1989,
the new social movements were responsible for 18 per cent of all protest events
in France and only 4 per cent in Switzerland. This difference is even stronger
for other movements, as they were responsible for 31 per cent of all protest
events in France and only 6 per cent in Switzerland. Therefore, models of 
citizenship indeed seem to play an important role in explaining the action
repertoires of immigrants and ethnic minorities, specifically by counteracting
the effect of the political-institutional context of contention.
While traditional political opportunity theories go a long way toward
explaining the action repertoires of social movements, they have little to say
about the content of claims. We argue that by taking into account the cultural
side of opportunities, we can provide a better explanation of the thematic focus
of claims by immigrants and ethnic minorities. Specifically, when migrants
address their claims to the host country, we expect them to focus on their inte-
gration in the host society (minority integration politics) in France and to deal
primarily with the regulation of immigration flows (the right to entry and stay
in the country) in Switzerland. Since the ethnic-assimilationist model of citi-
zenship produces a situation in which migrants have a fragile and unstable
status, on the rare occasions they act within the national public space, we
expect them to focus on the fragility of their status in the host society. In a
country with a civic-assimilationist model of citizenship like France, migrants
should deal primarily with their integration into the host society rather than
with their entry and stay in the country. Since they are to some extent accepted
as part of the national community and often have citizen status, they can focus
migrant mobilization
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Table 6. Claims by immigrants and ethnic minorities in France
and Switzerland by form of action, 1990–1998 (immigration
and ethnic relations field)
France Switzerland
Verbal claims 30.5 43.6
Conventional actions 18.3 12.0
Demonstrative actions 18.6 27.7
Confrontational actions 26.7 12.9
Violent actions 5.5 4.0
Total 99.0* 100.2*
N 419 101
*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding.
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on issues concerning their membership of the French community, specifically
on the recognition of their rights vis-à-vis the national majority. By contrast,
Switzerland’s ethnic-assimilationist model of citizenship, which is rather 
exclusionary with respect to immigrants and ethnic minorities, yields few
opportunities for claims regarding minority integration politics. As a conse-
quence, in such a context we should observe a small proportion of claims in
this issue field and a higher share of claims in immigration and asylum policy.
Table 7 (which shows the distribution of claims by thematic focus within
the immigration and ethnic relations field) allows us to confront with our data
the hypothesis that, due to the difference in the prevailing models of citizen-
ship, migrants tend to focus on minority integration politics in France and on
the regulation of immigration flows in Switzerland. The results go in the
expected direction, but only in part. On the one hand, if we look at the general
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Table 7. Claims by immigrants and ethnic minorities in France and Switzerland by thematic
focus, 1990–1998 (immigration and ethnic relations field)
France Switzerland
Immigration and asylum policy 32.6 32.6
Immigration and asylum policy general 0.6 2.1
Entry and border control 1.8 6.3
Registration and internal control 1.0 1.1
Recognition of residence rights 23.0 –
Expulsions 5.2 20.8
Voluntary return 1.0 1.0
Minority integration politics 42.2 26.3
Minority integration general 4.0 8.4
Minority rights and participation general 0.5 –
Naturalization and citizenship 0.3 –
Political rights and participation 1.6 1.1
Social rights and participation 4.9 9.5
Cultural rights and participation 17.3 5.4
Discrimination and unequal treatment 4.4 2.1
Minority social problems 2.6 –
Inter-ethnic, inter- and intra-organizational relations 6.8 –
Anti-racism 25.1 41.1
Racism in institutional contexts 1.3 1.1
Non-institutional racism and extreme-right tendencies 23.8 40.0
in society
Total 99.9* 100.0
N 383 95
Note: Excludes non-verbal claims.
*Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding.
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thematic focus, minority integration politics covers more than 40 per cent 
of claims in France and only about 25 per cent in Switzerland. The civic-
assimilationist model of citizenship thus seems indeed to encourage migrants
to deal primarily with their integration in the host society. On the other hand,
however, the proportion of claims in immigration and asylum policy is the
same in the two countries, which goes counter to our hypothesis that the Swiss
ethnic-assimilationist model of citizenship provides more opportunities to
make claims concerning the right of entry and stay in the country. As we can
see by looking at the more specific categories, the large majority of these
claims in France concern the recognition of residence rights and, in particu-
lar, the issue of sans-papiers (undocumented aliens) who have strongly mobi-
lized in the second half of the 1990s to ask for a regularization of their status.
In Switzerland, on the other hand, migrants have mobilized mostly to protest
against expulsions.
The thematic focus of claims, however, is in part subject to change over
time. If we look at the distribution of claims in time (results not shown), we
can see that in France in the early 1990s migrant mobilization was addressed
primarily to minority integration issues. In the more recent period, issues per-
taining to immigration and asylum policy (above all the recognition of resi-
dence rights of sans-papiers) have significantly increased, although overall
they remain less frequent than claims concerning minority integration 
politics. By contrast, migrants in Switzerland have shifted the main focus of
their claims from the regulation of flows to their situation in the host society.8
These shifts over time suggest that our argument regarding the impact of
models of citizenship on claim-making by immigrants and ethnic minorities is
stronger with respect to the distinction between politics of the host society and
homeland politics than to the thematic focus within the field of immigration
and ethnic relations. More generally, these shifts show that the relationship
between models of citizenship and claim-making by immigrants and ethnic
minorities may change due to specific events that open up new opportunities
for mobilization. Among these events, government policies certainly play a
major role. For example, if the strong stance of the French Minister of 
Education in the early 1990s against the wearing of the Islamic headscarf in
public schools gave rise to a wealth of claims over minority integration poli-
tics, the Pasqua Law of 1993 and also the Chevènement Circulaire of 1997
aggravated the situation of migrants with respect to their residence rights 
and status. This led the thematic focus of claims to shift from minority inte-
gration politics (which nevertheless remains dominant) to immigration and
asylum policy.
Table 7 also allows us to confront our data with further, more speculative,
hypotheses on the content of claims. We may hypothesize that, in the French
migrant mobilization
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context, ethnic minorities emphasize their collective identities in their claim-
making since France’s civic-assimilationist model of citizenship largely denies
the recognition of ethnic difference in favor of a civic allegiance to the repub-
lican values (e.g., Birnbaum 1998; Brubaker 1992; Leca 1992; Schnapper 1991).
Given the inclusive character of its formal criteria and its stress on cultural
assimilation, this model of citizenship creates a tension between the strong cul-
tural obligations required for incorporation into the host society and the will-
ingness of ethnic minorities to be assimilated. As a consequence, we should
observe a high proportion of claims seeking recognition of difference on the
part of minority groups, such as Muslims, whose collective identity is endan-
gered by the cultural requirements for assimilation. We expect migrants to
react to such demanding cultural requirements and mobilize primarily on
issues of cultural diversity and the recognition of ethnic difference.
The findings suggest that this is indeed the case. The proportion of claims
addressing cultural rights and participation in France is more that three times
higher than in Switzerland. More than a half of these claims are related to reli-
gion (results not shown), as was the conflict over the Islamic headscarf. The
principles of equality and of universal rights fostered by the French Revolu-
tion imply the denial of particularism and claims for the recognition of ethnic
difference and cultural diversity. However, as Young (1990) has pointed out,
cultural rights are inherent in individual personality, and it is often psycho-
logically difficult and socially quite destructive to have to downplay ethnic dif-
ferences. Migrants in France face a situation in which they are asked to avoid
expressing cultural diversity in the name of respect for French republicanism,
and it appears that they try to redress this situation by asking the authorities
(and more generally French society) to remove such constraints from their
everyday life.
Assimilationist pressures exist in Switzerland as well. However, the ethnic-
based conception of citizenship paradoxically diminishes their impact on the
collective identities of migrants. Since the difference between citizens and
aliens is defined along ethnic lines, the need to claim for the recognition of
cultural diversity is less urgent than in a civic-based context such as that of
France. The fundamental cleavage in Switzerland is not that between ethnic,
cultural or religious identities and the national, republican values, but rather
between the full social citizenship of nationals and the partial citizenship of
most migrants, who are often denied some of the rights to which nationals are
entitled. Whereas in France the fundamental conflict concerns the lack of cul-
tural recognition, in Switzerland it concerns the lack of social recognition. As
a result, when migrants address minority integration politics in Switzerland
they more often (about 10 per cent of all claims) ask for social and participa-
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tion rights that facilitate their living conditions in areas such as education,
health care, social security, and so forth (although the numbers here are
smaller and need to be treated with caution). Thus, demands that may improve
their living conditions – social rights and participation – become central as
regards minority integration politics. As any other claim relating to the situa-
tion of migrants in the host society, however, such demands remain marginal
compared to homeland politics issues.
Conclusion
A growing number of studies have stressed the importance of prevailing 
definitions of ‘citizenship’ and ‘regimes’ for the incorporation of migrants in
explaining cross-national variation in the relations between national majori-
ties and ethnic minorities of migrant origin (e.g., Birnbaum 1998; Brubaker
1992; Kastoryano 1996; Leca 1992; Schnapper 1991). Others have tried to
establish a link between such longstanding cultural traditions and the formu-
lation and outcomes of migration policies – in particular, policies regarding
access to citizenship (e.g., Freeman 1995; Hollifield 1992; Joppke 1999; Safran
1997). Our aim in this article is to contribute to the still sparse but growing
literature on collective mobilization and political claim-making by immigrants
and ethnic minorities (e.g., Blatt 1995; Fibbi & Bolzmann 1991; Ireland 1994;
Koopmans & Statham 1999b; Soysal 1997). We have conceptualized models of
citizenship as the cultural setting that determines the political opportunities
available for the intervention of migrants in the national public space and
affect the content of their claims. In our view, models of citizenship can specify
the ‘classical’ political opportunity structure (or at least important parts of it)
for a specific substantive field of interest – in our case, the field of ethnic rela-
tions, citizenship and immigration. Models of citizenship affect, on the one
hand, the legitimacy of these groups to take part in national public debates
and hence their overall presence in the national public space. On the other
hand, they define the legitimacy of migrants to intervene on the basis of their
ethnic identities and shape the content of their claims.
Our empirical evidence on claim-making by immigrants and ethnic minor-
ities in France and Switzerland has to a large extent confirmed our hypothe-
ses. First, concerning the access to the national public space, migrants have
mobilized around issues related to their situation in the host country more
often in France than in Switzerland, where they have focused primarily on
homeland issues. Second, we have observed variations in the thematic focus
of claims within the field of ethnic relations, citizenship and immigration. On
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a general level, minority integration politics is a more important issue field in
France than in Switzerland, although migrants have often made claims in
immigration and asylum policy in both countries and we observe important
fluctuations over time. These fluctuations lead us to nuance somewhat the
impact of models of citizenship on the content of claims.
Immigrants and ethnic minorities have often focused on cultural rights and
participation in France, whereas in Switzerland we observe a larger share of
claims on social rights and participation. Finally, we were able to show that
the prevailing model of citizenship counteracts the closed institutional op-
portunity structure in France and the openness of the political-institutional
context, resulting in rather similar action repertoires of migrants in the two
countries.
Our article brings evidence about claim-making by immigrants and ethnic
minorities to bear upon an important theoretical discussion in the literature
on contentious politics. Following recent calls for more careful attention to
cultural variables in the study of social movements (Gamson 1992; Johnston
& Klandermans 1995; Morris & McClurg Mueller 1992; Melucci 1996; Snow
et al. 1986), we stressed the impact of the cultural context on migrants’ claims
in France and Switzerland. Much, if not most, work on social movements
during the last two decades has focused upon institutional opportunities.
This has strengthened our knowledge of the structural conditions under 
which social protest emerges and develops over time. However, demands 
and institutions are culturally informed packages. Political claim-making is 
culturally embedded. Political opportunity theorists, apart from a few signifi-
cant exceptions (e.g., Diani 1996; Gamson & Meyer 1996; Koopmans &
Statham 1999a, 2000), have largely overlooked the impact of cultural variables.
We think that this is one of the reasons why the political process approach 
to social movements has been strong in explaining the rise and fall of 
protest, its extent and action repertoires, but has often remained silent as 
to its content. This gap clearly limits the explanatory power of this approach.
As we have tried to show, once we bring cultural factors back into our 
explanations, we are in a better position to account for variations across coun-
tries, as well as over time, in the general and specific content of contentious
politics.
We further think that cultural variables can also help to explain the emer-
gence and extent of protest insofar as they set the preconditions for chal-
lengers to enter the public space. Our study indicates that the prevailing
models of citizenship determine the legitimacy of migrants for participating in
national public debates. Together with the impact on the content of claims, this
leads to the conclusion that we should pay much more attention to cultural
variables in the study of contentious politics. However, we should not throw
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the baby out with the bath water. Political institutions do matter. In a way,
we are attempting to combine institutional and cultural explanations of 
claim-making. If models of citizenship allow us to understand the overall 
presence of immigrants and ethnic minorities in the national public space 
and the content of their claims, political-institutional variables remain crucial
in accounting for variations in the form of their actions as they largely 
define access to the political system. Yet the cultural setting determines 
the extent to which political institutions provide real opportunities for their
mobilization.
The Swiss political system offers social movements a favorable setting for
mobilizing insofar as it provides multiple points of access to the political
arenas due to the combination of open institutional structures and inclusive
prevailing strategies of the authorities (Kriesi et al. 1995). However, ethnic
minorities cannot fully take advantage of such opportunities as they are not
legitimate actors in the political process. As a result, they also lack strong 
political alliances, which have been shown to represent a crucial resource for
challengers (Della Porta & Rucht 1995; Kriesi et al. 1995; Tarrow 1998).
Although in a different way, the difficulty immigrants in France face in inter-
vening in the national public space on the basis of their ethnic identities also
reduces political opportunities for claim-making. In addition, migrant organi-
zations in France encounter important barriers to entry into political arenas
and especially to remaining active in them (Blatt 1995; Ireland 1994; Withol
de Wenden 1988). All this points to the need to specify the political opportu-
nity structures for a given policy area. We have tried to do so by showing how
models of citizenship shape the nature of claims made by minorities of migrant
origin in France and Switzerland. A similar approach could be applied to 
other issues as well and provide new insights into how specific opportunity
structures shape the form and content of political claims in different policy
fields.
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Notes
1. The relative shares of these three nationalities have changed substantially since the early
1960s. In 1962, for example, Italians represented 29.0 per cent of the total foreign popu-
lation, Spaniards 10.4 per cent and Portuguese, whose massive arrival is more recent, only
2.3 per cent (Ireland 1994: 13). The share of these three nationalities in 1990 (i.e., at the
beginning of the period studied here) was 7.0, 6.0 and 18.1 per cent, respectively (Taïeb
1998). The proportion of the three groups from the Maghreb has also changed, but to a
lesser extent. In 1962, the share of Algerians was 16.2 per cent, while Moroccans and
Tunisian formed only 1.5 and 1.2 per cent, respectively, of the foreign population (Ireland
1994: 13). In 1990, the share of these three nationalities was 17.1, 15.9 and 5.7 per cent,
respectively (Taïeb 1998).
2. In Switzerland, like France, the relative share of nationalities has changed over time.
For example, in 1960, Italians represented 59.1 per cent of the total foreign population,
Spaniards 2.4 per cent and Yugoslavs 0.2 per cent (Ireland 1994: 14). In 1991, the share
of these three nationalities was 31.9, 9.7 and 14.5 per cent, respectively (Ireland 1994:
14).
3. The juxtaposition of ‘ethnic’ and ‘assimilationist’ might appear as an oxymoron, since an
ethnic-based model excludes minorities from the national community, while assimilation
has an inclusive meaning. However, no nation is purely ethnic, at least among Western
democracies. Even if migrants are barely incorporated into the national community in
countries like Germany and Switzerland, the state must regulate relations between them
and the national majority. There are two main options to do this: assimilation (i.e., adap-
tation to the national culture) or pluralism (i.e., recognition of difference). In other words,
the collective definition of ‘citizenship’ and the cultural obligations posed on migrants
are two independent dimensions.
4. We thank Charles Tilly for having brought this example to our attention.
5. The concept of ‘models of citizenship’ shares some resemblance with that of ‘policy par-
adigm’ (Hall 1993) and ‘référentiel’ (Jobert & Muller 1987). However, we prefer to use
the term ‘model’ not only to be consistent with the existing literature on migration, but
above all because both the concepts of ‘policy paradigm’ and ‘référentiel’ have been used
in a narrower sense with regard to public policy to refer to the set of beliefs, norms and
images that characterize policy-makers and instruments.
6. It is the MERCI project (‘Mobilization on Ethnic Relations, Citizenship and Immigra-
tion’), which includes five West European countries: Germany and Britain (study con-
ducted by Ruud Koopmans at the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung 
and Paul Statham at the University of Leeds), France and Switzerland (Marco Giugni at
the University of Geneva and Florence Passy at the University of Lausanne) and the
Netherlands (Thom Duyvené de Wit at the University of Amsterdam).
7. It should also be remarked that immigrant mobilization in Switzerland is much more
radical if we include claims not pertaining to the field of immigration and ethnic rela-
tions. To do so, however, would in a way bias the analysis. Collective mobilizations con-
cerning homeland politics are not directly influenced by the Swiss political opportunity
structure as they address the country of origin rather than the host society. As such, they
depend more on the specific conflict or situation in the homeland. At the same time, this
demonstrates that the civic-based conception of citizenship in France, as compared to the
ethnic-based conception in Switzerland, has a moderating effect on the action repertoire
of immigrants and ethnic minorities.
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8. In both cases, the shift is very important. For example, if we divide the period under con-
sideration in two halves (1990–1993 and 1994–1998), claims concerning immigration and
asylum policy have increased from 19 to 43 per cent in France, while they have dimin-
ished from 49 to 22 per cent in Switzerland. At the same time, claims concerning minor-
ity integration politics have gone from 58 to 33 per cent in France and from 24 to 32 per
cent in Switzerland. All these figures refer to verbal claims only, but the proportions for
all claims do not differ much.
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